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At Sea with Sehaffer v. Heitnier:
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transport Agencies
In 1966 the separate body of Admiralty Rules' was abolished and
actions brought under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction were included under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since that merger,
the problem of resolving questions in areas- of the law where traditional
admiralty procedures differed greatly from civil practice has persisted.
In the process of unification, supplemental rules were promulgated to
retain certain remedies unique to the Admiralty Rules which were not
available under the civil rules. 2 The fundamental goal has been to preserve substantial rights based on the unique nature of the admiralty and
maritime context while abolishing differences between admiralty and
civil rules affecting only procedural matters. In Grand Bahama Petroleum
Co. v. Canadian Transport Agencies, 3 the court had to determine whether
the maritime attachment procedure authorized by Supplemental Rule
4
B(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure met constitutional due
process requirements. The court held that the special considerations of
admiralty allowed quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to be established by attachment of a defendant's property located within a district. However, the
court went on to declare Supplemental Rule B(l) unconstitutional for
of
failing to provide procedural safeguards against mistaken deprivation
5
rights.
process
due
defendant's
the
of
property in violation
I Admiralty Rules (1920) (amended 1966), reprintedin 7A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
130, at 221 (2d. ed. 1978).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims [hereinafter cited as FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.].
3 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. SupP. R. B(l) states:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the complaint to
the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within the district. Such
a complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit signed by the plaintiff or his
attorney that, to the affiant's knowledge, or to the best of his information and
belief, the defendant cannot be found within the district. When a verified com-

plaint is supported by such an affidavit the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons
and process of attachment and garnishment. In addition, or in the alternative,
the plaintiff may, pursuant to Rule 4(e), invoke the remedies provided by state

law for attachment and garnishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for Rule E(8) these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies so invoked.

5 450 F. Supp. at 459-60.
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Plaintiff Grand Bahama Petroleum (GBP) alleged that it supplied
the Soviet flag M/V KUIBSHEVGES with fuel and services worth
$40,963.68 from GBP's terminal in Freeport, Bahamas. At the time, the
vessel was allegedly under charter to the defendants, citizens of Canada.
GBP alleged that the defendants had failed to make a required deposit
for the fuel purchase or to pay the amount due. GBP therefore sought to
garnish $8,851.38 in a Seattle bank account belonging to the defendants.
The defendants sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Relying on the
Supreme Court decision in Shafer v. Heitner,6 the defendants claimed that
attachment of their assest in a district was impermissible unless they had
minimum contacts with that district. 7 The defendants also claimed that
the procedure enumerated in Rule B(l) did not provide sufficient safeguards against mistaken deprivation of property. 8
The court rejected the contention that the minimum contacts requirement set forth in Shafr for actions in rem necessarily applied to
admiralty. Granting that the only contact the defendant had with the
district was the bank account, the court stated that the action against
property was the keystone of admiralty jurisprudence and sought to distinguish the holding in Shaffer on constitutional and analytical grounds. 9
The court asserted that the historical autonomy of admiralty from the
common law was of constitutional magnitude, citing the special recognition accorded admiralty in both the Constitution' 0 and in the legislation
by Congress establishing and empowering the Federal judiciary. I
The court, having established the constitutional autonomy of admiralty jurisdiction, proceeded to identify the special factors extant in the
admiralty context that justified the separate treatment of admiralty disputes. One such factor was the transience of both individuals and property engaged in maritime pursuits. The court quoted from the opinion in
Re Lou.odle Underwriters: "Courts of admiralty are established for the
settlement of disputes between persons engaged in commerce and navigation, who, on the one hand, may be absent from their homes for long
periods of time, and, on the other hand, often have property or credits in
other places."' 12 The nature of the interests involved, plus the interest in
providing remedies without unnecessarily impeding commerce, provided
sufficient analytical justification for special treatment of admiralty cases.
6 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7 Ste International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945):

[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

8 450 F. Supp. at 456.
9 Id. at 453.
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

11 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat.
93-94.

12 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890).
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In refusing to apply the minimum contacts requirement to admiralty,
the court concluded, "the recognized autonomy of admiralty jurisprudence, although not absolute, and the long constitutional viability of
maritime attachment compel me to conclude that Shafr does not reach
13
Rule B(l) attachment."'
The court next weighed the defendant's claim that the procedural
safeguards enumerated in Rule B(1) were inadequate to protect against
mistaken deprivation of property. Rule B(1) allows the writ of attachment to issue based on an affidavit signed by either the plaintiff or his
attorney.' 4 Specific facts which would allow the judicial officer to make
an independent determination that the defendant is not in the district
are not required. 15 Mere conclusory allegations, which may even be
based on hearsay, will suffice. 1 6 Finally, the Rule allows the writ to issue
from a clerk. 17 The court found the procedure established by Rule B(l)
and followed by GBP to be substantially similar to the Georgia garnishment procedure' found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in
North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem. Inc. 19 Like the Georgia garnishment procedure, Rule B(l) fails to make any provision for an expeditious
hearing that would allow the defendant to contest the validity of the
attachment. Because of the lack of procedural safeguards, the court
found the Rule B(I) attachment procedure to be unconstitutional as violative of the right of the defendant not to be deprived of property with20
out due process of law.
The court refused to accept GBP's contention that due process requirements are less stringent in the admiralty context, therefore requiring fewer procedural safeguards. GBP contended that the Rule B(1)
procedure could be justified by language of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Fuentes v. Shevin. 2 ' There the Court, in the process of invalidating the
Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes for their failure
13450 F. Supp. at 455.
14 FED. R. Civ. P. SUPP. R. B(I).
15 Id.
16 Id.
'7 Id.
Is GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 allowed the affidavit requesting the writ of garnishment to be
filed by the plaintiff, his agent, or his attorney. The statute did not require that specific facts be
alleged in the affidavit; it required only a statement that a claimed amount was due and an
apprehension of loss unless garnishment issued. The statute permitted the writ to issue from an
officer authorized to issue an attachment or from the clerk of a court of record. The party
seeking garnishment was required to post bond in double the amount claimed to be due, payable to the garnishee should the plaintiff fail to recover in the suit or should it be found that the

amount claimed was not actually due.
Section 46-103 required only that the affidavit made by the agent or attorney of the plaintiff be "to the best of his knowledge and belief."
Section 46-401 allowed the defendant to dissolve the garnishment by posting a bond for an
amount equal to the payment of any judgment that might be rendered on the garnishment.
19 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
20 450 F. Supp. at 456.
21 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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to provide for hearings prior to seizure, recognized that "extraordinary
circumstances" might justify postponement of notice and opportunity for
a hearing. 22 Three factors were enumerated that, together, would create
such extraordinary circumstances. First, the seizure must be directly necessary to secure an important governmental or public interest. Second,
there must be a special need for prompt action. And third, the State
must keep strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force; the person
initiating the seizure should be a judicial official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that prejudgment action was necessary and justified in the particular instance. 23 In
the instant case, the court found that only a private interest was at stake
in garnishing the bank account; no pretense of important government or
public interest existed. Because the attachment failed to have a public
purpose, the court did not bother to apply the other prongs of the Fuentes
24
test.
Finally, the court refused GBP's assertion that the special nature of
maritime dealings justified dispensing with procedural safeguards. The
interest of maritime plaintiffs in having a speedy remedy was not sufficient to justify denial of procedural due process rights to maritime defendants. Quoting Fuentes, the court stated: "Procedural due process is
not intended to promote efficiency or accomodate all possible interests; it
is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose posses'25
sions are about to be taken."
The challenges to Supplemental Rule B(1) raised in Grand Bahama
represent a confluence of two streams of case law development expanding the protection accorded property rights by the due process
clause. The first stream, commencing with InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington26 and leading to Shafer v. Heitner,27 has developed the requirement
that a defendant have certain minimum contacts within a district so that
assertion of jurisdiction over his person or his property does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 28 The second
29
stream, emanating from the opinion in Sniadach v. Family Flance Corp.,
has expanded the range of procedural safeguards required to assure protection of the possessory interest in property in prejudgment proceedings
instituted by creditors.
The minimum contacts requirement was first enunciated in International Shoe, 30 where the Supreme Court shifted its attention towards the
rights of the defendant. The Court required that, in order for in per22 Id. at 90.
23 Id. at 91.
24 450 F. Supp. at 457.

25 407 U.S. at 90, n.22.
26
27
28
29

326
433
326
395

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

310 (1945).
186 (1977).
at 316.
337 (1969).

30 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

sonam jurisdiction to be established over a defendant within a district,
that defendant must be shown to have sufficient contacts or ties within
3
that district to make the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable and just. '
Emphasis was placed on the degree that such contacts would assure actual notice to the defendant 32 and the degree to which the defendant's
presence would make it reasonable for him to defend a suit within the
33
jurisdiction.
In Shafer v. Heitner the Supreme Court extended the minimum contacts requirement to apply also to suits brought in rem and quasi-inrem. 34 Prior to that decision, attachment of a defendant's property located in a district could subject the defendant to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction there. Such jurisdiction could attach whether or not the defendant's
activities had any relationship with the district. This practice received its
35
clearest expression in Pennoyer v. Neff.
It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the the nonresident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that
nonresident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be
carried out only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the
property.36
The question posed in Shaffer was whether attachment of stocks in Delaware provided sufficient basis for the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
by a Delaware court. The situation was complicated by the fact that the
actual certificates were not physically present in Delaware;3 7 the stock
was considered to be in Delaware by virtue of a state statute making
Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock held in Delaware corporations. 38 None of the defendants resided in Delaware. The Supreme
Court held that the Delaware statute authorizing sequestration of the
stock was unconstitutional, ruling that assertions of both in rem and
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the minimum
contacts standard.3 9 The Court reasoned:
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair play
and substantial justice" as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam
is simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that "(t)he
phrase 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical4°way of
referring to jurisdiction over the interest of persons in a thing."
The court in GrandBahama refused to follow this reasoning and apply the minimum contacts standard to admiralty. The defendant in
GrandBahama admittedly lacked minimum contacts in the district where
31 326 U.S. at 320.
32 Id. at 316.
33 Id. at 317.
34 433 U.S. at 212.
35 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
36 Id. at 723.
37 433 U.S. at 192.
38 DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
8, § 169 (Michie 1975).
39 433 U.S. at 212.
40 Id. at 207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, § 56, Introductory
Note (1971).
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jurisdiction was asserted. Its only contact with the district was the presence of the bank account. The court found, however, that the minimum
contacts requirement would be inconsistent with traditional admiralty
practice. Sovereignty, defined as the power over property, served as the
historical basis for admiralty jurisdiction and was claimed necessary for
the continued vitality of admiralty jurisprudence. 41 Hence the minimum contacts requirement would not be essential to establish quasi-inrem jurisdiction in admiralty.
The court then proceeded to evaluate the procedure for attachment
of the defendant's property provided in Rule B(l), which authorizes
summary issuance of the writ by the clerk of court upon submission by
the plaintiff or his lawyer of an affidavit which need recite only conclusory allegations. 4 2 The procedure did not accord prior notice to the
defendant or provide for a prompt hearing in which the attachment
could be challenged. It therefore was subject to challenge in light of the
line of cases emanating from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,43 in which
the Supreme Court declared Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment procedure44 unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that the in rem
seizure of an employee's wages, without affording the employee prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, violated due process and could potentially impose a tremendous hardship on the wage earner.
In Mitchell v. W.T Grant Co., 4 5 however, the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the Louisiana sequestration procedure which provided for
judicial control of the attachment process from beginning to end. The
procedure also required the plaintiff to file bond equal to the value of the
property sequestered. The Supreme Court held that the judicial supervision, bond requirement, and requirement that the plaintiff supply specific facts to justify the sequestration, combined to produce a
46
constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties.
Soon after Mitchell, the Supreme Court, in North Georgia FinishingInc.
v. Di-Chem Inc.,4 7 declared the Georgia garnishment procedure unconstitutional. In Di-Chem the defendant's corporate bank account had been
attached by a creditor to secure its indebtedness. The Court dismissed
the plaintiffs contention that the opinion in Sniadach should be narrowly
construed to extend prejudgment safeguards only to situations in which
wages are the object of the garnishment: "We are no more inclined now
than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of
41 450 F. Supp. at 452-53.
42 FED. R. CIv. P. Supp. R. B(l).

43 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
44 WIS. STAT. § 269.18(2)(a)(1957)(current

version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.10 (West

1977)). The Wisconsin statute provided that the clerk of the court would issue a summons at
the request of the creditor's lawyers. The lawyer would then serve the garnishee, and, within
ten days, the defendant. The wages of the defendant were thereby frozen.
45 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
46 Id. at 607.
47 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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property in applying the Due Process Clause."' 48
The court in Grand Bahama concurred in the defendant's assertion
that the case was almost completely on point with Di-Chem. 49 However,
it then had to evaluate GBP's contention that the admiralty context constituted an extraordinary situation justifying postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. The circumstances justifying special exceptions
to the requirement of procedural safeguards are, as previously mentioned, the existence of an important government or general public interest, a special need for prompt action, and strict State control over the
monopoly of necessary force. 50 GBP sought to invoke Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 5 1 to bring its case within the exception. In
Calero-Toledo, a pleasure yacht leased by Pearson to a Puerto Rican resident, was seized pursuant to a Puerto Rican statute providing for forfeiture of vessels used for illegal purposes. Marijuana was discovered
aboard the vessel while it was in control of the lessee. The statute did not
provide for notice and prior hearing for the lessor owners. In upholding
the seizure, the Supreme Court held that the three requirements necessary to constitute an extraordinary situation were present. There was a
significant government purpose in preventing continued illicit use of the
property. Preseizure notice might frustrate this government interest by
allowing time to remove the mobile property from the district. Finally,
the seizure was made by government officials rather than self-interested
private parties. 52 The court in Grand Bahama refused to treat Calero- Toledo as apposite; it was not merely the admiralty context, but the specific
fact situation, which created the extraordinary circumstances and justi53
fied relaxation of due process procedural safeguards.
Finding nothing in the facts of the instant case to merit GBP's claim
that it presented an extraordinary situation permitting procedural safeguards to be dispensed with, the court held that the attachment of the
.defendant's bank account under Rule B(1) was an unconstitutional violation of due process rights.5 4 The court thus concluded that the admiralty context alone did not provide sufficient grounds to distinguish the
case from the procedurally similar Di-Chem case.
The problem confronting the court in Grand Bahama was to distinguish between the substantive and procedural aspects of traditional maritime law. In abolishing the separate body of Admiralty Rules, Congress
intended to merge the procedural aspects with the rules of civil procedure, while preserving the substantive aspects. The analytical justification for maintaining in rem jurisdiction in admiralty is the frequency
48 Id. at

608.

49 450 F. Supp. at 456.

Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(1).
rteh. denid 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
52 416 U.S. at 679.
53 450 F. Supp. at 457.
54 Id. at 459.
50

51 416 U.S. 663 (1974),

N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

318

with which the property is the res, or subject matter, of the dispute. The
presence of such property as a ship or cargo in a district provides an
indication that the defendant enjoys some contacts there. Further, such
property is likely to be related to the dispute and thus provide some further basis for jurisdiction to attach. The attachment of the bank account
in Grand Bahama, however, is a quasi-in-rem rather than an in rem procedure. Sovereignty over property provides tenuous justification for assertion of jurisdiction when that property is unrelated to the dispute. In
such a case, the factors which would serve to protect the defendant's
rights in an admiralty proceeding in rem are absent.
Returning to the due process claim, the court held that the admiralty context of the dispute provided insufficient justification for dispensing with procedural safeguards. In Techem Chemical Co. v. M/T Choyu
Maru,55 the court took cognizance of the realities of maritime practice in
the case of the in rem attachment of a tanker: "In practice, the owner
almost always receives prompt notice of the seizure and employs an attorney who arranges for the release of the vessel upon the posting of a
bond, letter of credit, or other undertaking. '56 Where the object of the
attachment is not the res of the dispute, and is not under the immediate
supervision and operation of the owner's agents as a ship would be, there
is less guarantee that the owner will receive actual notice of attachment.
Thus, the attachment of a bank account as in the instant case provides
no assurance that the owner will be promptly notified.
The court's holding, which applied modern procedural safeguards
to the process of maritime attachment, is supported by and consistent
with the procedure by which the writ historically issued. As early as
1825, in Manro v. Almeida, 57 the Supreme Court said of the proceeding of
maritime attachment:
[T]o prevent the abuses to which it is liable, it is indispensably necessary
that this process should only issue by an express order of the Court.

There is no precedent for its issuing, of course, and as it cannot issue
without an affidavit, the sufficiency of the matter contained in the affidavit, and the libel, are fit subjects for the determination of the Judge,
and ought not to be confided
to the discretion of a mere ministerial of58
ficer, such as the clerk.

Through invalidating Rule B(1), the opinion in Grand Bahama is consistent in applying the most recent procedural safeguards to the admiralty
55 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976).
56 Id. at 968. Even given this general pattern of events, the defendant's rights may nonetheless be trampled. In Tchem Chemical the affidavit supporting attachment listed damages
claimed by the plaintiff at ten times their actual amount. This mistake, asserted in conclusory
fashion, went unquestioned in the issuance of the writ. Though the shipowner received notice of
the attachment almost immediately, a wrongful attachment of even short duration could cause
signficant economic hardship in the cases of vessels with considerable operating expenses or
those on strict schedules.
57 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473 (1825).

58

d. at 483-84.
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jurisdiction and upholding the historical emphasis in admiralty placed
on procedural rights in issuing the writ of maritime attachment.
The decision in Grand Bahama represents an important step in the
unification of the admiralty rules with the rules of civil procedure. It
supports the reasonable premise that the unification was intended to provide procedural uniformity without altering substantive rights in admiralty. 59 In extending procedural rights to admiralty, the court
recognized that the maritime context, without more, provided insufficient justification for dispensing with these rights entirely. The court did
not determine that the safeguards applicable in admiralty need be identical to those required in civil cases. 6° Special conditions raised by the
admiralty context must be considered in balancing the right of the plaintiff to a remedy with the right of the defendant not to be deprived of his
property without due process of law. However, the court properly recognized that maritime exigencies do not justify dispensing with procedural
safeguards to provide the maritime plaintiff a remedy.
The rejection of Shaffir v. Heiner in the admiralty context is more
dubious. Here the court relied heavily on its observation of the unique
characteristics of the maritime context. It underscored the constant mobility of individuals, the transience of property, and the distant situs of
assets to justify the continued vitality of admiralty's traditional autonomy. This reasoning failed to recognize that such conditions are increasingly characteristic of other segments of human activity. In the
nineteenth century travel and transience were virtually unique to admiralty; technological developments in transportation and communication
and increased international business activity have made them applicable
to other areas of society. As such, there is less justification to accord admiralty unique and autonomous status.
By dismissing the minimum contacts requirement in admiralty,
GrandBahama supports the contention that one engaged in maritime activities is vulnerable to jurisdiction in any locale where he possesses property which may be subject to attachment. Such a contention is
potentially a source of considerable unfairness. Grand Bahama provides
an illustrative example: the State of Washington, where the plaintiff
sought to invoke jurisdiction, was a continent removed from the scene of
the transaction which precipitated the dispute, and neither party was
shown to have any ties with the locale except for the defendant's bank
account. The minimum contacts requirement, applied to quasi-in-rem
suits by Shaffer, prevents such a situation without forcing the defendant
59 Note, Admiralty Practie After Uniftatio. Barnacles on the Procedural Hull, 81 YALE L.J.
1154, 1157 (1972).
60 Judge Beeks speculated that the transitory nature of maritime property and the necessity for prompt action might justify issuance of the writ of attachment ex parte, based on a
judicial determination and subject to a prompt hearing in which the defendant could require

the plaintiff to show cause. 450 F. Supp. at 459, n. 84.
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61
To
to resort to the difficult and limited remedy of challenging venue.
iminconvenient,
been
litigate this dispute in Washington would have
practical, and inefficient for both the parties and the courts. Because the
court had clear due process grounds on which to reject the attachment of
the defendant's bank account, it failed to recognize fully the independent
significance of the minimum contacts requirement as a means of assuring
fair play and substantial justice.

--LAWRENCE

J.

TYTLA

61 "Admiralty courts have jurisdiction of admiralty suits entirely between foreigners when
proper service can be had or property attached, but it is discretionary with the court whether it
will accept such jurisdiction or not." 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 216 (rev. 7th ed. 1974).
For a similar fact situation where the court refused to exercise jurisdiction, see Iberian
Tanks Co. v. Terminales Maracaibo, C.A., 322 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

